Social Reconstruction in Uganda: The Role of Customary Mechanisms in Transitional Justice

Joanna R. Quinn

In the aftermath of prolonged civil conflict, social repair is essential. Countries like Uganda, various parts of which have been at war since 1962, are in need of healing and renewal. This paper explores the use of customary mechanisms, instead of trials and truth commissions, to bring about societal acknowledgement of what has happened, and it offers ideas as to how these traditional practices might augment the rebuilding process in Uganda.

Introduction

Practitioners and theorists of transitional justice and post-conflict resolution are effectively engaged in helping societies move either from war to peace, or from a repressive or authoritarian regime to democracy. In so doing, they face a number of challenges. However, repairing the social interactions and institutions of a particular society is paramount, as it can help prevent the recurrence of violence.

In Uganda, where civil conflict has raged since 1962, many of the institutions that have been created and implemented by the national government and the international community, like the truth commission, have shown themselves to be unable to promote this kind of acknowledgement, at least in some circumstances. As a preliminary examination of a lesser-known and understood means of achieving social reconstruction, this paper explores the existence and use of traditional practices against the more commonly recognized framework of the truth commission in Uganda. It also provides some ideas for their implementation.

Social and Political Context

Since the time of Uganda's independence in 1962, political violence and repression have devastated the country. Post-colonial governments have pursued policies to divide the population. "The Ugandan leaders who took over after Independence hoped they would form a Ugandan mono-culture and that people would forget their own cultures. Which is very difficult. The way it was done was by using the police to do it.

And the people suffered."[1] From 1962 until 1986, Uganda experienced a series of coups, culminating in a great concentration of power in the hands of the head of state.

The country's first president was an ethnic Langi, Milton Obote. Obote's first term in power was characterized by significant numbers of riots and armed attacks.[2] Many of the violent protests were carried out by the Baganda in protest against Obote's consolidation of power. Other uprisings came from the Ugandan military.

Obote was overthrown by a military faction headed by Idi Amin, his top general, who suspended the constitution and ruled under a provisional government structure until 1979. To sustain his authority, Amin, who came to be known as 'the butcher,' conducted a reign of terror, systematically murdering and torturing those he considered were standing in his way.[3] He targeted those who were seen to have supported Obote, especially people of Acholi and Langi descent. More than 70,000 ethnic Asians who had been living in Uganda for many years were brutally expelled by Amin in 1972 and their property was confiscated.[4] During this period, violence was rampant, and the military and paramilitary mechanisms of the state conducted brutal campaigns of torture.[5] Conservative estimates of the number killed between 1971 and 1979 place the figure at between 300,000[6] and 500,000.[7]

In April 1979, Amin's forces were defeated. Interim governments were appointed in 1979 and 1980, and after rigged elections in 1980, former President Obote returned to power. He remained until July 1985 when he was overthrown again by a faction of the Ugandan military. The country was once again assailed by "rampant human rights abuses,"[8] this time, far worse than anything experienced during Obote's first term in office. The paramilitary apparatus of the state again began its practice of routinely violating human rights by means of rape, torture, looting, and destruction of property.[9] The scale of repression and abuse was roughly the same as it had been under Amin. The only difference for many Ugandans was that their former leader (Amin) had been substituted for another (Obote) with a heightened, reinvigorated fury. Conservative estimates again place the number of those killed during this period at approximately 300,000[10] to 500,000.[11] From July 1985, a military council governed for 6 months until it, too, was overthrown.

Yoweri Museveni seized power in January 1986, abolishing all political parties except the National Resistance Movement (NRM, formerly the National Resistance Army, NRA) that had made his victory possible.[12] Museveni and the NRM had been fighting against the regimes of Amin and Obote, as well as the transitional regimes in Uganda since 1971.[13]

Between 1986 and 2006, Museveni faced more than 20 armed insurgencies.[14] One of the longest-lasting and most devastating is the conflict in northern Uganda, which has raged since 1986 between a group of rebels called The Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) and the Government of Uganda. The roots of the conflict lie in the political mishandling of power.[15] Along the way, the conflict has destroyed social relationships and structures. An estimated 1.8 million people live in camps for internally displaced people (IDP), more than 80% of the population of the region.[16] The government's counter-insurgency strategy of creating

'protected villages' has forced entire communities to flee their homes and livelihoods, reassembling in disjointed, overcrowded camps where inhabitants are largely dependent on external assistance. Far from being protected, they continue to be attacked by the rebels on a regular basis.[17] It is also widely estimated that 30,000 children[18] from that region have been abducted by the rebels, the boys to act as soldiers, and kidnapped girls to be used by rebels as sex slaves, carriers of supplies, and some as soldiers.

Nearly four decades of intense struggle and brutality have exacted a high cost, both militarily and economically, all of which has destroyed the social and political foundations of the country. While it is true that the nature of the repression and abuse suffered under the regimes of Obote and Amin has abated somewhat under the leadership of Museveni,[19] "[t]he government's human rights record remain[s] poor; although there [have been] some improvements in a few areas, serious problems remain."[20] It is still the case that "far too many people have no stake in society and must rely on crime, corruption, or banditry to survive."[21] Freedom House criticizes Uganda's lack of respect for civil and political rights and categorizes the country as only "partly free."[22]

There is, however, some indication that civil society is growing. Soon after acceding to power, "Museveni devised a grass-roots political strategy that sought to bring about participatory democracy in Uganda(... Although they have given many Ugandans access to the political system, these institutions are weak and suffer from corruption, favoritism, and incompetence."[23] Citizens sometimes still associate 'government' with violence and corruption.[24] A newspaper editor reported that since Museveni came to power, "these groups have definitely opened up with the political situation easing up."[25] But an NGO representative cautioned, "civil society is trying to come up now, but there is a lot of intimidation and fear. They are afraid to challenge the Government."[26]

Political opposition to Museveni continues to grow.[27] A recent skirmish between police and opposition party members heading for a banned political rally resulted in one death and the wounding of two others, plus arrests.[28] Even members of the NRM have begun to disagree publicly with his stance on democratization and political pluralism.[29]

Until 2006, political parties were banned in Uganda as part of Museveni's "support of 'no-party' politics and a 'no-party' constitution."[30] Indeed, Museveni himself remains in power only after several controversial changes of the country's constitution and contentious elections.[31] As a result, many of those whom I have interviewed are extremely cautious about criticizing the government in any way, often refusing to speak with me unless I can guarantee their anonymity – a clear indication of the manner in which they perceive their political agency. It is clear that democracy is not firmly entrenched, and Museveni shows no sign of allowing it to take hold.[32]

All of this is complicated by the fact that Uganda is one of the states in the world most badly affected by HIV and AIDS.[33] It is estimated that 1.5 million

people currently live with HIV or AIDS.[34] Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) have been forced to assume much of the burden of the provision and contribution of financial support,[35] as the state itself has been financially unable to offer assistance in all areas.[36] The socio-political situation is also made much more difficult by the high levels of poverty and underdevelopment that continue to plague the country.[37] These factors combine to reduce many people's ability and desire to participate in anything other than "vital" activities such as working and taking care of their families.

Post-Conflict Social Reconstruction

Many have written about the critical role that the processes of acknowledgement, forgiveness, and reconciliation can play in social repair.[38] Elsewhere, I have also attempted to elucidate just how these processes ought to function in bringing about conditions conducive to reconstruction. My own model emphasizes the strong, causal relationship between acknowledgement and forgiveness, social trust, and reconciliation, thus, emphasizing the importance of acknowledging past events in facilitating any one of these outcomes.[39] I argue that acknowledging past crimes can then lead to participation and civic engagement, the generation of social capital, and ultimately social cohesion, the "key intervening variable between social capital and violent conflict"[40] – ultimately, reconciliation.

In the end, state and international efforts to recover post-conflict legality, legitimacy, and justice aim to produce the kinds of conditions that might reasonably allow the processes of acknowledgement, forgiveness, and reconciliation to flourish. "In the course of such transitions, societies have to struggle over how much to acknowledge, whether to punish, and how to recover. How to treat the continuing presence of perpetrators, and victims, and bystanders, after the violence has ended is a central problem, or better put, series of problems."[41] Hence, notions of retribution and punishment, the underlying principles of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), and the recent initiation of the International Criminal Court (ICC), signify a number of desires, including the reestablishment of the rule of law, and deterring future potential criminals. Other mechanisms, such as truth commissions, are consistent with a restorative ideology that focuses on making a community whole again, often bringing perpetrators back into the community and providing social teaching.

It is by now often the case that more than one mechanism of transitional justice is employed in this capacity. Most countries have opted for either a trial, or an international tribunal, or a truth commission, or an amnesty, or a series of national trials, or some form of reparation in the form of financial restitution or apology. In Sierra Leone, for example, a hybrid court, the Special Court for Sierra Leone, was developed and worked in tandem with a truth commission. In Chile, a blanket amnesty has been declared, there has been a truth commission, national trials, and

international intervention. The Guatemalan *Comisión para el Esclarecimiento Histórico*, on the other hand, was prevented from naming names, thereby precluding further judicial inquiry.

Scholars of transitional justice are still trying to sort out the order in which such mechanisms should be utilized to bring about the maximum possible sustainable change. It is becoming clear that finding the precise combination of mechanisms to respond to past atrocity is paramount. It is also apparent that "contextual concerns should inform the pursuit of prosecutions and truth commissions"[42] and, by extension, other mechanisms and responses and that "it is the responsibility of private groups, national stages, and international bodies to devise responses in light of such contextual inquiries."[43]

Uganda has experimented with a number of transitional justice mechanisms since 1986 when Museveni seized power. From 1986 to 1994, a truth commission called the Commission of Inquiry into Violation of Human Rights worked to gather information about the abuses committed between 1962 and 1986.[44] In November 1999, the Government of Uganda passed the Amnesty Act, which was enacted in January 2000, in an attempt to end the war in northern Uganda. The Act guarantees amnesty to those who had been involved in any conflict between 1986 and 2000. But, to signal his displeasure with the Amnesty process, Museveni formally requested that the International Criminal Court (ICC) investigate the actions of the Lord's Resistance Army in northern Uganda on December 2003, an act made public by the Prosecutor in January 2004. This strange, unwieldy combination of mechanisms is unmistakably hindering the process of peacemaking and transition within the country.

In an earlier study, I considered the ability of the Ugandan truth commission, the Commission of Inquiry into Violations of Human Rights, to foster a process of acknowledgement. Indeed, what I found was that the Commission had been beset by any number of shortcomings from the very beginning. Nor could I find much evidence of its success in promoting the process of societal acknowledgement.

Yet, many of those to whom I spoke in Uganda during the course of that study suggested that some form of acknowledgement had, in fact, taken place. Although there was no evidence of the cultivation of acknowledgement through the formal mechanism of the truth commission, it seemed likely that some of the traditional, informal practices that are engaged within the country might be capable of producing this kind of acknowledgement and that, even without the formal structure of the truth commission, some communities might have been acknowledging the events of the past and coming to terms with them. I thought an exploration of this kind of traditional acknowledgement in Uganda could provide a much-needed insight into one of the reasons why truth commissions and other institutions often called upon in the rebuilding process are not effective.

Between 2004 and 2006, I returned to Uganda for a period of 4 months to study first-hand these informal mechanisms of acknowledgement, both in areas where traditional acknowledgement has been reported and those where it has not. What I

found in Uganda seems to echo what others are beginning to report around the world: Traditional mechanisms exist and have done so for years, providing a strong system of both governance and reconciliation, outside the formal mechanisms imposed by the Western world. Moreover, whereas the more formalized Western models often allow for only one form of justice – retributive, restorative, or reparative – these traditional institutions seek to combine various of these and other elements in keeping with the values of the community.

Uganda's Truth Commission(s)

Truth commissions have been variously classified, with scholars not yet agreed on a single definition. In the form of trials, tribunals, and/or investigatory bodies, all have attempted to address and also to redress a legacy of human rights abuses in a particular country, in various forms and with varying degrees of success. Scholars are also divided over which institutions ought and ought not to be included in such a category. Brazil's truth-seeking effort, for example, is not generally considered a bona fide truth commission; however, Guatemala's truth-seeking exercise, on the other hand, is seen as a truth commission. The distinction to be made between the two is that the Brazilian process involved neither participation nor direct testimony from Brazilian citizens and was conducted in secret. The Guatemalan process, conversely, was conducted in the open and in virtually every area of the country.

Whether or not a country's attempt at restorative justice ought to be counted as a truth commission then really depends on the manner in which the truth commission is defined. I define a truth commission to be made up of four components: it is (a) a non-judicial investigatory body established, sanctioned, or empowered by the state (or by a dominant faction within the state) to (b) determine the truth about widespread human rights violations that occurred (c) in the past to discover which parties may be blamed for their participation in perpetrating such violations (d) over a specified period of time.[45] These four characteristics adequately address the various needs of the truth commission. The implicit recognition by the state of the truth commission is especially important, as it gives the commission both legitimacy and, theoretically at least, affords it many of the privileges and protections extended to institutions of the state itself. It is also the case that the commission should be established to investigate patterns of abuses and specific violations committed over a period of time and not just a single specific event. This broad focus sets the truth commission apart from other types of institutions. It is particularly important to note that the commission cannot be expected to look into violations that continue, as those forces committing the crimes could seriously hinder the commission's work. Finally, the commission must be given a specified, temporary time period within which to conduct its work. This distinguishes truth commissions from more permanent human rights commissions that are often simultaneously established.

Uganda's Commission of Inquiry into Violation of Human Rights was the second attempt at a truth commission in the country's post-Independence history. The first was the "Commission of Inquiry into 'Disappearances' of People in Uganda Since the 25th of January, 1971", which was established by Idi Amin in 1974 to look into the large numbers of disappearances alleged to have taken place during the first years of the Amin government. The report was never published, and none of its recommendations were ever implemented. Indeed, "gross abuses by the Public Safety Unit and the State Research Bureau escalated over the following years until Amin's overthrow in 1979." [46]

The Commission of Inquiry into Violations of Human Rights (CIVHR) was appointed on 16 May 1986, 3 months after Museveni took office, and inaugurated in June of that year. [47] Until the tabling of the Report on 10 October 1994, the Commission worked to gather evidence and testimony relating to the events of 1962 to 1986. Thousands of people completed questionnaires. From among these, particularly strong and representative cases were chosen to appear before the Commission. In all, 608 witnesses appeared before the CIVHR, from 11 December 1986 to 7 April 1993. [48] The Commission traveled to many regions of the country, holding hearings and collecting testimony in 17 districts. [49] This testimony was gathered and bound into 18 volumes. The final report was more than 720 pages long, and contained testimony, analysis, and recommendations, along with lists of names of those who were subjected to torture and abuse.

Nonetheless, the Commission was unable to accomplish much. To begin with, Museveni was hasty in appointing the Commission. Its mandate was extremely broad and vague and included the need to investigate every human rights abuse that had been committed between the time of Independence in 1962 and the beginning of Museveni's term in office. The legislation listed nine wide-ranging categories of violations for consideration and demanded that the Commissioners consider "any other matter connected with or incidental to the[se] matters." [50] Otherwise, the scope, size, and subject matter for consideration were largely undetermined, as was the manner in which such abuses ought to be dealt with. Neither the fact that these abuses totaled well into the hundreds of thousands, nor were specified, was addressed. As so often happens in the establishment of truth commissions, this sweeping mandate proved difficult to manage. [51]

In the end, the commission was unsuccessful for a number of reasons detailed below. [52] Most of its recommendations, which included suggestions for democratic development, human rights education, constitutional guarantees and international treaty responsibilities, prosecutions and legal responsibilities, and the need for reform in military and security sectors, were never implemented. Even the report and its findings were never broadly publicized; most people in Uganda remain unaware that a truth commission had ever been at work.

The CIVHR faced a number of constraints. From the very beginning, the Commission seemed unable to gather the momentum necessary to carry out an activity on this scale. Even once the Commission determined its role, there were

many difficulties to be overcome. Although the Commissioners variously reported that "the facts were known to everybody," one commissioner noted "the absence of hard evidence," as physical proof was eroded or destroyed. At different points in the work of the Commission, significant amounts of evidence went missing.[53] Furthermore, agencies of government appear to have been unable and perhaps unwilling to tolerate the Commission's attempt to delve into the issues of the past.

Another problem that significantly hindered the Commission's work was the extreme lack of funding and resources. Indeed, there was no provision made for funding the actual day-to-day activities of the CIVHR.[54] This lack of attention is indicative of the lack of commitment to the CIVHR by Museveni and the NRM, who simply had other priorities, as evidenced both by government spending and program initiatives. Therefore, the Commission faced chronic shortages, including transportation to and from hearings outside Kampala, staff, filing cabinets, and stationery. Throughout the life of the CIVHR, each of the Commissioners held other jobs, which was necessary because their work for the Commission and, thus, their pay was sporadic – work was at times forced to a halt for months because there was no more funding. From time to time, Commissioners were even forced to ask those whose testimony they were to hear to provide their own paper and pen that the testimony could be recorded.[55] In the end, it took 8 years for a final report to be prepared and tabled. In fact, it is thanks to the external donor community that the Commission was able to finish its work at all.

Time is another institutional constraint. Initially it had been hoped that the work of the CIVHR could be completed within a period of 3 years, although it was not until 8 years after it began that the report was tabled. In addition, rebellions in Acholi and Karamojong made these areas inaccessible during certain periods of the Commission's life. Yet other factors also weighed heavily on the CIVHR. When it did resume, the distances that needed to be traveled to reach outlying areas and collect testimony, along with the sheer numbers of people to be seen, as well as a lack of cooperation by the Criminal Investigations Department (CID) and the Directorate of Public Prosecutions (DPP), made for difficult work. As isolated episodes, each of the impediments faced by the Commission would have been minor. As a group they conspired to set the work of the Commission back by more than 5 years. When the report was finally produced, more than 8 years from its appointment, it was without significant fanfare – people had already largely forgotten about the struggling commission.

A lack of political will also played a substantial role in the relative failure of the Commission. Indeed, Museveni failed to provide adequate funding for the Commission, nor to provide it with the facilities it required, in direct contradiction of his earlier promises. To appease the world community, Museveni needed to take some steps in the direction of securing peace and guaranteeing human rights to the citizens of Uganda. Announcing the truth commission appeared to solve many of his problems in one fell swoop: He could convince Ugandans that he cared about the abuses they had suffered, and he would have proof for the

international community of his human rights reforms. Once the CIVHR was announced, however, his focus on righting past wrongs began to dissipate.

Although Museveni at least paid lip service to these important ideas of human rights and making a record of the events of the past, the Ministry of Justice was to have had an overseer's role with respect to the Commission, yet those arms of the Commission that were supported by the Ministry of Justice, the Solicitors General and the Attorneys General, the Criminal Investigations Department and the Director of Public Prosecutions, managed to thwart the Commission's work with their relative inaction. Very few cases were ever investigated and a smaller number were ever prosecuted.[56]

The legacy of the CIVHR, then, is small. Very few people ever had contact with the Commission, and many have stated that, although they might have heard about it, they were reluctant to open up to an apparatus of the state – a real concern because Ugandans had been routinely victimized by the state for many years. Only one of its recommendations was ever implemented: the formation of a permanent Human Rights Commission. Meanwhile, most people in Uganda remain unaware that their country has ever had a truth commission.

Traditional Mechanisms

Traditional communal values inform practices that societies have used for thousands of years in resolving conflict and healing rifts that have been created. African traditional beliefs sustain these practices:

> If you have harmed my child, it is because something has gone wrong with you to such an extent that you could do that. That which has gone wrong for you is now harming my life. It means I cannot be the kind of human being I want to be because you are no longer human. Therefore, it is in my interest – my interest – as the victim, to get you and assist you to get your humanity back so that I can become human again... This is a fundamentally different way of looking at a community and looking at what to do with evil. African traditional religion has no such thing as Satan. The biggest evil is to live in complete disregard of others.[57]

Throughout Africa, societies, and communities have developed and continue to use a diverse range of such traditional mechanisms. Internally displaced, war-affected people in Angola utilize a type of traditional psychological healing called *conselho*, which is based on "the general encouragement given to people to abandon the thoughts and memories of war and losses."[58] Holistic purification and cleansing rituals attended by the family and broader community are carried out when welcoming ex-combatant child soldiers back into the community in both Angola and Mozambique.[59] In Western Kenya, traditional conflict resolution mechanisms are used by the Pokot, Turkana, Samburu, and Marakwet tribes.[60] Ceremonies to "cool the heart[s]" of child ex-combatants upon their return to their home communities in Sierra Leone are carried out by the broader community.[61] Inkundla in South Africa comprises a series of traditional small claims courts,[62]

whereas Rwanda has chosen to utilize its tradition of *gacaca*, a form of traditional dispute resolution mediated by chiefs and tribal elders, most recently re-vamped, formalized, and used to deal with crimes of genocide.[63]

Uganda has a particularly vibrant history of the use of traditional mechanisms, and these institutions are still used in many of the 56 different ethnic groups within the country.[64] Among the Karamojong, the *akiriket* councils of elders adjudicate disputes according to traditional customs,[65] which include cultural teaching and ritual cleansing ceremonies.[66] The Acholi carry out ceremonies of *mato oput* (drinking the bitter herb) and *nyouo tong gweno* (a welcome ceremony in which an egg is stepped on over an *opobo* twig) in welcoming ex-combatant child soldiers home after they have been decommissioned.[67] The Baganda use the traditional *Kitewuliza*, a juridical process with a strong element of reconciliation, to bring about justice.[68] The Lugbara, in the northwest of the country, maintain a system of elder mediation in family, clan and inter-clan conflict.[69] In 1985, too, an inter-tribal reconciliation ceremony, *gomo tong* (the bending of spears) was held to signify that "from that time there would be no war or fighting between Acholi and Madi, Kakwa, Lugbara, or Alur of West Nile."[70]

Although these mechanisms differ between regions and also between ethnic groups within a particular region, it is important to note that, in all cases, they have always served as important elements in the process of post-conflict resolution.[71] "Traditional systems of government were not elaborate because law and order were maintained through the normative system which was part of the social structure." [72]

The customs and practices performed in Uganda to deal with conflict at the group, community, clan, or neighborhood level contain a number of different components.[73] These include arbitration, social teaching, reconciliation, and compensation. It is clear that, in the practical definition of many of these elements, the boundaries between restorative and retributive justice, as mentioned above, begin to blur.[74] Each of these is explored below.

Arbitration, or "the traditional administration of justice,"[75] is similar to the trials mentioned above. Indeed, those involved in a dispute or conflict appear before a panel of wise or powerful men.[76] Through the deliberations of a standing committee[77] or group of elders held in secret[78] or in the open,[79] leaders generally come to a common agreement and decide upon a suitable punishment. This was seen as crucial: "without taking proportional retribution in grave cases, a society dishonors itself, and undermines public confidence that the society takes itself and its values seriously."[80] Yet this retribution is linked directly with other social controls including socialization[81] and compensation, discussed further below, and unlike the Western retributive model, this kind of judgement is sought only as a last-ditch attempt to find resolution, after the adjudicators have exhausted all other means at their disposal.[82]

A key part of the conflict resolution process is mediation, wherein one person or a group of people acts as a go-between among the offended parties and the

offender. Waliggo identifies mediation as "the most commonly appreciated means of solving conflicts" in many rural African communities.[83] Mediation is distinct from adjudication or arbitration, in that all parties have equal power, and the decisions come "out of the clans and families from the bottom up, not the top down."[84] This is closely linked with the process of negotiation, wherein, "using the African wisdom, the elders and even the two parties themselves gradually come to a common agreement."[85] In this way, "individual problems can be solved and a wider societal balance achieved.... [The session] is not only one of individual healing but also a process of socialization."[86]

Another vital part of this process, in many cases, is compensation. Indeed, the Acholi traditions counted compensation as a precondition for their reconciliation ceremonies.[87] This is echoed in claims that "forgiveness comes after the payment of damages"[88] and calls for "reconciliation through disbursement."[89] Finnstrom reports that "social barriers can be dissolved by admitting wrongdoing and deciding on compensation."[90]

Surrounding all of this, of course, is the element of reconciliation. Waliggo maintains that "reconciliation was always an essential and final part of every legal and other peaceful settlement of conflict... [Yet, he maintains that] it also stood on its own."[91] In many different ethnic configurations, such as the institutions of the Karamojong, reconciliation is always the first element of this process to be attempted,[92] and of the Acholi mechanisms, Rwot Onen David Acana II said, "*poro lok ki mato oput*" ("Peace talks and reconciliation are the best way to resolve conflict.").[93]

This reconciliation is then demonstrated through various rites and symbols. These range from very elaborate celebrations and ceremonies to more common rituals. These may include blood pact alliances, marriage, intimate friendships, and communal celebrations to consolidate peace.[94] Others include eating and drinking together, the shaking of hands, and the exchange of gifts to show restoration of peace,[95] as well as the slaughter of animals and the exchange of dried coffee berries.[96] One such ceremony performed among the Acholi demonstrates the care and symbolism bestowed upon these ceremonies:

> After the initial part of the *mato oput* ceremony is carried out, the parties are asked "May you today come and drink and eat and share everything together. Will you make this day a day to come together?" Both parties then go into house where two sheep have been slaughtered. The sheep are placed at opposing ends and someone from each side with a sharp knife cuts both in half at the same time. Half of each sheep is given to each side at the same time. And each party cooks its sheep halves. They then go to a house where both will share food together, and both sides begin to eat together. After eating inside the home, the lower jaws of both sheep are taken by each side. The heads of the clans will take the jaws and carry them back to their homes to be put safely away as living testimony that the blood of the sheep had cleansed the one-time hostile clans. So from then on, when a dispute is about to erupt between both clans, they will bring out the jaw as a reminder that we had agreed never to do this kind of thing again. The jaw is kept for posterity.[97]

The impact of such institutions and mechanisms upon societies is now being noted by major world institutions. The World Bank says that "cultural heritage has the power to inspire hope" and urges "the protection and conservation of cultural heritage in complex emergencies."[98] The Security Council, too, has noted the "importance of assessing the particular justice and rule of law needs in each... country, taking into consideration the nature of the country's legal system, traditions, and institutions."[99]

Others question the relevance of such institutions on rapidly urbanizing and globalizing societies. Indeed, "the traditional values, cultural knowledge and social institutions of everyday life are threatened."[100] It is clear that, among the Karamojong[101] and also among the Acholi,[102] cultural education through practice and social education is beginning to decline. Among the Sabiny tribe in the northeast, there is no longer a council of elders, although the clan system is still very active. "These ceremonies are not widely practiced now – the cows are no longer there. But the clan system of punishment is still strong. It is still the role of the clan to make sure that the perpetrator faces repercussions."[103] Indeed, the Bakiga, a tribe from the southwest of the country, used regularly to consult the *abakuru b'emiryango* (council of heads of lineages), which would adjudicate cases of dispute or wrongdoing, although this is no longer done.[104]

Even in areas where these ceremonies and rites are no longer regularly practiced, however, there remains a common understanding of the meanings and symbolism behind them. "The situation is complicated because of diversity of ethnicity but there is some commonality. The shedding of blood, for example, is a common element throughout all districts in Uganda; it cuts across all groups."[105] In other cases, eating and drinking together, the shaking of hands, and the exchange of gifts can all symbolize the restoration of peace, as well as the slaughter of animals, the exchange of dried coffee berries, intermarriage, and blood relationships.[106] Although some argue differently,[107] my interviewees stated that the younger generation maintains a healthy respect for traditional institutions:

> Under Obote I, Obote II, that was the climax of leaving out those traditional things, because people had to find their own way to survive. Those who are there, some do remember, but many more who have gone to Kenya do remember more those traditional methods. My dad, in particular, has some memory of what happened with traditions, and my grandma also – she is in her eighties, I think. The new generation does not belong anywhere. They are neither new nor old. But everyone respects these traditions.[108]

However, "the traditional values, cultural knowledge and social institutions of everyday life are threatened."[109] And the social meanings of the ceremonies that are still practiced appear, in some cases, to be shifting[110] as people move farther away from their *gemeinschaft* communities. This is especially true in regions where large numbers of people have been forced out of their homes and into IDP camps.[111] As another Sabiny interviewee put it: "Circumcision is the main ceremony for our people. People are taught how to behave. Teachings are taught

before and after the ceremony. You are becoming an adult. So the ceremonies are a period of education for a people to teach about how to raise children and live in harmony and how to behave in society. But now, many are not cut, so we do not know. Maybe they should leave out cutting and still have these teachings." The same growing lack of cultural education holds true for custom and ceremony among the Karamojong[112] and also among the Acholi.[113]

Mbiti argues:

It would be wrong to imagine that everything traditional has been changed or forgotten so much that no traces of it are to be found. If anything, the changes are generally on the surface, affecting the material side of life, and only beginning to reach the deeper levels of the thinking pattern, language content, mental images, emotions, beliefs and response in situations of need. Traditional concepts still form the essential background of many African peoples, though obviously this differs from individual to individual and from place to place. I believe... that the majority of our people with little or no formal education still hold on to their traditional corpus of beliefs.[114]

Finnstrom and others also take this into account: "These practices, far from being dislocated in a past that no longer exists, have always continued to be situated socially. They are called upon to address present concerns. Of course, like any culturally informed practice, with time they shift in meaning and appearance."[115] "Ideas about old models are often used to help shape new ones."[116]

Utility in Post-Conflict Social Reconstruction

Elsewhere, I have argued for the creation of a national, centralized body working for the establishment of acknowledgement and the promotion of reconciliation in Uganda.[117] It seems that these kinds of traditional practices have a role to play, particularly, because they are still respected and carry a significant amount of meaning among those who use them. The obvious question is whether local mechanisms can be utilized in any meaningful way to carry out a project of national reconciliation. Indeed, I am carrying out a longer-term research project that is still underway, which is trying to determine how these kinds of customary practices might be applied across and between ethnic groups. There are important examples of this having been done in Uganda, including the *gomo tong*, mentioned above. Truth commissions, on the other hand, have twice had limited or no success in Uganda.

Traditional mechanisms, however, continue to provide an alternative means of dealing with conflict resolution and post-conflict problems. In many parts of Uganda, such practices, in fact, have more formal authority than comparable Western models. They have substantially more authority than that enjoyed by either of the two truth commissions. This is particularly the case among the Sabiny[118] and the Karamojong.[119] It was frequently reported to me that councils of elders hold more sway within the community than do government-appointed

law enforcement officers and that such councils have the authority to override police sentences: "For example, a clan may come to the police to demand a prisoner's release because conditions in prison are too good. Therefore, they will go to the prison and pull him out, and the police do not dare say no because they will have to deal with 500 armed warriors!"[120]

It seems clear, however, that these traditional mechanisms have a great deal to offer. It was variously reported to me that "everyone respects these traditions,"[121] and that reconciliation continues to be an "essential and final part of peaceful settlement of conflict."[122] A common understanding of these symbols, ceremonies, and institutions, and their meanings, remains prevalent throughout Uganda.

As such, the promotion of the kinds of institutions frequently discussed by those working to resolve conflict ought to be a priority. In Northern Uganda, for example, where the civil war has been waged by the Lord's Resistance Army over the past 19 years, the current debate about the use of the International Criminal Court (ICC) and the process of amnesty available through the Amnesty Commission, must be framed within the context of Acholi's particularly vibrant traditions of justice, compensation, and reconciliation. Similarly, in aiming to resolve the weapons and raiding problems among the Karamojong and their neighbours in Eastern Uganda and Western Kenya, any solution devised must be built around traditional Karamojong institutions, including the *akiriket* and the authority of the elders.

By utilizing these mechanisms wholesale or by borrowing liberally from them to formulate new practices and institutions, the latent understanding of such mechanisms will translate strongly to the new institutions. Furthermore, their use will serve to strengthen levels of social trust and civic engagement within these societies; for if the people believe in and trust such mechanisms, it is believed that they will participate in the activities promoted by them. Certainly, it is clear from the experience of the Commission of Inquiry into Violations of Human Rights (CIVHR) in Uganda that foreign institutions simply do not engender this same kind of trust; as a result, institutions like the truth commission are simply ignored as people go about their daily lives, pursuing the kinds of mechanisms they know and trust.

In any case, no such process can be implemented within a community without the express commitment of that community. As history has demonstrated, top-down processes in Uganda, from the CIVHR to the ICC, frequently meet with resistance. As demonstrated above, traditional practices generally involve "bottom up" participation.[123] And this should be respected.

Notes

1.   Unnamed government official, interview with author, 15 July 2001, Kampala, Uganda.
2.   Berg-Schlosser, Dirk, and Rainer Siegler. 1990. *Political Stability and Development: A Comparative Analysis of Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda.* Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers. 196.

3. Wright, Nancy G. 1996. "Uganda: History From 1971." In John Middleton (ed.), *Encyclopedia of Africa South of the Sahara*. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 306.

4. Pirouet, M. Louise. 1991. "Human rights issues in Museveni's Uganda." In Hölger Bernt Hansen and Michael Twaddle (eds.). *Changing Uganda*. Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press. 305.

5. Berg-Schlosser, Dirk, and Rainer Siegler. Ibid. 199; Khiddu-Makubuya, Edward. 1989. "Paramilitarism and Human Rights" In Kumar Rupesinghe (ed.), *Conflict Resolution in Uganda.* Oslo: International Peace Research Institute. 141–157.

6. Briggs, Philip. 1998. *Uganda.* Old Saybrook, CT: The Globe Pequot Press. 23.

7. Museveni, Yoweri K. 1997. *Sowing the Mustard Seed.* London: Macmillan. 41.

8. Famighetti, Robert (ed.). 1998. "Uganda." In *The World Almanac and Book of Facts*. Mahwah, NJ: Primedia Reference. 852.

9. Berg-Schlosser and Siegler, ibid. 199; Khiddu-Makubuya, "Paramilitarism." 153.

10. *Author name?* 1998. *Uganda.* Brooklyn: Interlink Books. 53; Ofcansky, X.Y. 1996. *Uganda: Tarnished Pearl of Africa.* Boulder: Westview. 55.

11. Abdul Nadduli, LCV District Chairman, Luweero Triangle, interview with author, 17 Nov. 2004, Luweero, Uganda.

12. For a much more complete account of Uganda's history from 1971, see Berg-Schlosser and Siegler, ibid. 97–132.

13. Museveni, *Sowing the Mustard Seed.* 33, 46–173.

14. These include rebellions by the Action Restore Peace, Allied Democratic Forces, Apac rebellion, Citizen Army for Multiparty Politics, Force Obote Back, Former Uganda National Army, Holy Spirit Movement, the Lord's Army, Lord's Resistance Army, National Federal Army, National Union for the Liberation of Uganda, Ninth October Movement, People's Redemption Army, Uganda Christian Democratic Army, Uganda Federal Democratic Front, Uganda Freedom Movement, Ugandan National Democratic Army, Uganda National Federal Army, Ugandan National Liberation Front, Ugandan National Rescue Fronts I and II, Ugandan People's Army, Ugandan People's Democratic Army, Uganda Salvation Army, and the West Nile Bank Front. Compiled from Hovil, Lucy and Zachary Lomo. 2004 (Feb.). *Working Paper 11: Behind the Violence: Causes, Consequences and the Search for Solutions to the War in Northern Uganda.* Kampala: Refugee Law Project. 4; and Hovil, Lucy and Zachary Lomo. 2005 (Feb.). *Working Paper 15: Whose Justice? Perceptions of Uganda's Amnesty Act 2000: The Potential for Conflict Resolution and Long-Term Reconciliation.* Kampala: Refugee Law Project. 6.

15. For an analysis of the root causes of the conflict, see Lomo, Zachary and Lucy Hovil. 2004 (Feb.). *Behind the Violence: Causes, Consequences and the Search for Solutions to the War in Northern Uganda* Refugee Law Project Working Paper No. 11.

16. World Vision. 2004. *Pawns of Politics: Children, Conflict and Peace in Northern Uganda.* Kampala: World Vision. 4.

17. Médecins Sans Frontières. 2004. *Life in Northern Uganda: all Shades of Grief and Fear.* MSF.

18. Tim Allen points out that "the scale of abduction is a matter of speculation" due to insufficient monitoring. See Allen, Tim. 2005 (Feb.). *War and Justice in Northern Uganda: An Assessment of the International Criminal Court's Intervention*. London: Crisis States Research Centre, Development Studies Institute, London School of Economics. iii.

19. Hyden, Goran 1998. "The Challenges of Constitutionalizing Politics in Uganda." In Holger Bernt Hansen and Michael Twaddle (eds.) *Developing Uganda.* Oxford: James Currey. 113.

20. US Department of State. 2005 (Mar.). *Country Reports on Human Rights Practices – 2005*; available from http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2005/61598.htm; accessed 26 June 2006.

21. Ofcansky, *Uganda: Tarnished Pearl of Africa.* 155.

22. Freedom House. 2005. *Country Report: Uganda (2005)*; available from http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=22year=2005country=6854; accessed 22 June 2006.

23. Ofcansky, *Uganda: Tarnished Pearl of Africa.* 154.

24. Tumusiime, James and Sylvester Onyang. 1999 (11 Sep.). "UPDF amasses in Karamoja." *The Monitor*; [article on-line]; available from http://www.africanews.org/east/uganda/stories/19990911_feat4.html; internet.

25. Unnamed newspaper editor, interview with author, 20 July 2001, Kampala, Uganda.
26. Unnamed NGO official, interview with author, 16 November 2004, Kampala, Uganda.
27. Ofcansky, *Uganda: Tarnished Pearl of Africa.* 157.
28. Busharizi, Paul. "One Killed in Uganda Ahead of Banned Rally." Reuters On-line, available from http://www.reuters/com/news_article.jhtml?type=worldnewsStoryID=510967; Internet; accessed 12 January 2002.
29. Ocitti, *Political Evolution.* 358–360.
30. Ofcansky, *Uganda: Tarnished Pearl of Africa.* 155.
31. Museveni was returned to power in the first multi-party elections since his accession to power on 23 February 2006, reportedly with 59% of the vote. At the time of writing the results of the election are being officially contested by Museveni's chief political rival, Kizza Besigye.
32. Recently, the British government cut its assistance to Uganda, citing Museveni's undemocratic governance. "U.K. aid cut pressures Uganda," BBC News [article on-line]; available from http://newsvote.bbc.co.uk/mpapps/pagetools/print/news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/449838, accessed 1 May 2005.
33. "Mariandina AIDS Research Foundation," *National Information Centre*, 11 Sep. 1999; [article on-line]; available from http://www.mariandina.or.ug; internet.
34. Freedom House, *Country Report: Uganda (2005)*.
35. Hansen, Hölger Bernt and Michael Twaddle. 1991. "Introduction." In Hölger Bernt Hansen and Michael Twaddle (eds.), *Changing Uganda: The Dilemmas of Structural Adjustment and Revolutionary Change.* London: James Currey. 15.
36. Dicklich, Susan. 1998. "Indigenous NGOs and political participation." In, Hölger Bernt Hansen and Michael Twaddle (eds.), *Developing Uganda.* Oxford: James Currey. 145.
37. Uganda was ranked 144 of 177 countries in the 2003 Human Development Index. UNDP, *Human Development Index* (2003); available from http://hdr.undp.org/statistics/data/indicators.cfm?x=1y=1z=1; accessed 26 June 2006.
38. See Govier, Trudy. 2002. *Forgiveness and Revenge.* New York: Routledge; Borer, Tristan Anne (ed.). 2006. *Telling the Truths.* Chicago, IL.: Notre Dame University Press; Helmick, Raymond and Rodney Petersen. 2001. *Forgiveness and Reconciliation.* Templeton Foundation Press; Murphy, Jeffrie. 2003. *Getting Even.* Oxford: Oxford University Press; De Gruchy, John W. 2002. *Reconciliation: Restoring Justice.* Chico, CA, Fortress; Lederach, John Paul. 2005. *The Moral Imagination* Oxford: Oxford University Press.
39. Quinn, Joanna R. 2003. "The Politics of Acknowledgement: Truth Commissions in Uganda and Haiti." Ph.D. Dissertation, McMaster University. 9–47; Quinn, Joanna R. 2005 (15 May). "What of Reconciliation?" Paper presented to the conference on "Reconciliation" held by the Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict Research Group, University of Western Ontario, London, ON, Canada.
40. Colletta Nat J. and Michelle L. Cullen. 2000. *Violent Conflict and the Transformation of Social Capital.* Washington: The World Bank. 13. See also Sen, Amartya. 1999. *Development as Freedom.* New York: Knopf.
41. Minow, Martha. 1998. *Between Vengeance and Forgiveness: Facing History after Genocide and Mass Violence*. Boston: Beacon Press. 2.
42. Ibid., 132.
43. Ibid., 135.
44. In reality this was Uganda's second truth commission. Idi Amin had appointed "The Commission of Inquiry into 'Disappearances' of People in Uganda Since the 25th of January ,1971" in 1974. See Hayner, Priscilla. 1994. "Fifteen Truth Commissions – 1974 to 1994." *Human Rights Quarterly* 16: 611–613.
45. This is different from definitions offered by Hayner, Gibney, Van Zyl and others, but more adequately addresses the conditions of truth commissions in my estimation. See van Zyl, Paul. 1999 (17 Jun.) "Plenary Session: Truth Commissions." Paper presented at the Twelfth Annual Meeting of The Academic Council on the United Nations System. New York, NY, USA; Gibney, Mark. 1994. "Decommunization: Human Rights Lessons from the Past and Present, and Prospects for the Future." *Denver Journal of International Law and Policy* 23(1): 87–133; Hayner, "Fifteen Truth Commissions." 604.

46. Carver, Richard. 1990 (Jul.). "Called to Account: How African Governments Investigate Human Rights Violations." *African Affairs,* 89:356, 397.
47. Although the CIVHR was named and appointed in May, it was not until June that its work officially began. This is common for truth commissions, which must first design a mandate for themselves, find office space and furniture, and hire staff. For a discussion in greater depth see Quinn, Joanna and Mark Freeman. 2003. "Lessons Learned: Practical Lessons Gleaned from Inside the Truth Commissions of Guatemala and South Africa." *Human Rights Quarterly.* Accepted for publication.
48. Republic of Uganda, *The Report of the CIVHR*, Appendix 10: xxx.
49. Ibid., Table Three: V–VI.
50. Republic of Uganda, *The Report of the CIVHR*, 3–4.
51. The experience of Guatemala in this regard is similar. See Tomuschatt, Christian. 2000. "Clarification Commission in Guatemala." *Human Rights Quarterly* 23:2, 239–240.
52. For a more detailed account of the CIVHR, see Quinn, Joanna R. 2004. "Constraints: The Un-Doing of the Ugandan Truth Commission." *Human Rights Quarterly.* 26:2(May), 401–427
53. Republic of Uganda, *The Report of the CIVHR*, 18, Sec 2.9 (III).
54. Republic of Uganda, *The Report of the CIVHR*, 16, Sec 2.9 (I).
55. Kakwenzire, Joan. 1990. "Problems of Implementing Human Rights in Uganda." *Three Papers Presented before the Commission of Inquiry into Violations of Human Rights, February 15–16, 1990, Kampala, Uganda.* Washington, DC: US Committee for Refugees. 28.
56. Ibid., 18, Sec 2.9 (III).
57. Antjie Krog interviewed by Philip Coulter in *Walk to Freedom* (*Ideas*, Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, 2004).
58. Eyber, Carola and Alastair Ager. 2002. "Conselho: psychological healing in displaced communities in Angola." *The Lancet* 360(Sep. 14), 871.
59. Honwana, Alcinda. 2001. "Children of War: Understanding War and War Cleansing in Mozambique and Angola." In Simon Chesterman (ed.). *Civilians in War.* Boulder: Lynne Rienner. 1137–140; Nordstrom, Carolyn. 1997. *A Different Kind of War Story.* Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. 142–152.
60. Pkalya, Ruto, Mohamud Adan, and Isabella Masinde. 2004. In Betty Rabar and Martin Karimi (eds.), *Indigenous Democracy: Traditional Conflict Resolution Mechanisms*. Kenya: Intermediate Technology Development Group – Eastern Africa.
61. Shaw, Rosalind. 2005. *Rethinking Truth and Reconciliation Commissions: Lessons from Sierra Leone.* United States Institute of Peace, Special Report 130. 9.
62. *Gacaca, Inkundla, traditional systems of justice being looked at in the US as "Restorative Justice."* Herndon, VA: Marek Publications, 2001, [article on-line]; available from http://www.marekinc.com/GovernanceINT100901.html, accessed 22 July 2002.
63. See, for example, Harrell, Peter E. 2003. *Rwanda's Gamble: Gacaca and a New Model of Transitional Justice.* New York: Writers Club Press.
64. For a discussion in greater depth of the use of traditional mechanisms in Uganda see Quinn, Joanna R. 2005. "What of Reconciliation? Traditional Mechanisms of Acknowledgement in Uganda." Paper prepared for *Reconciliation*, a conference held by the Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict Research Centre at The University of Western Ontario (May 14–15).
65. Novelli, Bruno. 1999. *Karimojong Traditional Religion.* Kampala: Comboni Missionaries. 169–172, 333–340.
66. Peter Lokeris, Minister of State for Karamoja, interviewed by author 18 Nov. 2004, Kampala, Uganda.
67. For an excellent description of *mato oput* see Finnstrom, Sverker. 2003. *Living With Bad Surroundings: War and Existential Uncertainty in Acholiland in Northern Uganda.* Uppsala: Acta Universitatis Upsaliensis, Uppsala Studies in Cultural Anthropology No. 35. 297–299.
68. Waliggo, John Mary. 2003. "The Human Right to Peace for Every Person and Every Society." Paper presented to Public Dialogue organized by Faculty of Arts, Makerere University in conjunction with Uganda Human Rights Commission and NORAD, Kampala, Uganda, 4 Dec., author's collection, 7. Idem, "On Kitewuliza in Buganda, 3 May 2005," author's collection, 1.

69. Ndrua, Joseph 1988. "A Christian Study of the African Concept of Authority and the Administration of Justice among the Lugbari of North Western Uganda." M.A. Dissertation, Catholic Higher Institute of Eastern Africa.. 42–56.
70. Finnstrom, *Living With Bad Surroundings*, 299.
71. Shorter, Aylward. 1998. *African Culture: An Overview: Socio-Cultural Anthropology.* Nairobi: Paulines Publications Africa. 65.
72. Ayisi, Eric O. 1979. *An Introduction to the Study of African Culture*, 2nd ed. Nairobi: East African Publishers. 110.
73. Waliggo, "The Human Right to Peace." 7.
74. Oldenquist, Andrew. 1988. "An Explanation of Retribution." *Journal of Philosophy* 85:9(Sept., 471.
75. Waliggo, "The Human Right to Peace." 8.
76. Ayisi, *An Introduction to the Study of African Culture*, 67, 111; Novelli, Bruno. 1988. *Aspects of Karimojong Ethnosociology.* Verona: Museum Combonianum No. 44. 48; and Ngologoza, Paul. 1998. *Kigezi and Its People.* Kampala: Fountain Publishers. 20.
77. Ngologoza speaks of the *Abakuru b'emiryango* as such; see *Kigezi and Its People*, 20.
78. Waliggo, *The Human Right to Peace.* 8.
79. Ngologoza, *Kigezi and Its People.* 20.
80. Oldenquist, "An Evaluation of Retribution." 471.
81. Ayisi, *An Introduction to the Study of African Culture.* 111. See also Finnstrom, *Living With Bad Surroundings.* 76, 201, 219; Novelli, *Karimojong Traditional Religion.* 201–225; andEvans Pritchard, E.E. 1937. *Witchcraft, Oracles and Magic Among the Azande.* Oxford: Clarendon Press. 154.
82. Novelli, *Aspects of Karimojong Ethnosociology.* 73.
83. Waliggo, *The Human Right to Peace.* 8.
84. Ross, Rupert. 1996. *Returning to the Teachings.* Toronto: Penguin. 55.
85. Waliggo, *The Human Right to Peace.* 8.
86. Finnstrom, *Living With Bad Surroundings.* 219.
87. Geresome Latim, Executive Secretary, *Ker Kwaro Acholi*, interview with author, 22 Nov. 2004, Gulu, Uganda.
88. Pain,Dennis. 1997. *The Bending of Spears.* International Alert (Dec.). 55.
89. Ibid., 34.
90. Finnstrom, *Living With Bad Surroundings.* 297.
91. Waliggo, *The Human Right to Peace.* 9.
92. Novelli, *Aspects of Karimojong Ethnosociology.* 73.
93. Quoted in Allen, Tim. 2005. *War and Justice in Northern Uganda: An Assessment of the International Criminal Court's Intervention.* London: Crisis States Research Centre, Development Studies Institute, London School of Economics (Feb.). 67.
94. Waliggo, *The Human Right to Peace.* 6,9; see also Ngologoza, *Kigezi and Its People.* 32.
95. Waliggo, John Mary. 2003. "Reconciliation as a Means of Resolving Conflict and Restoring Relations." Paper presented at AMECEA Pastoral Institute, Eldoret, Kenya, 6 June. Author's collection. 2.
96. Sister Specioza Kabahoma, Justice and Peace Commission, interview with author, 10 Nov. 2004, Nsambya, Uganda.
97. Geresome Latim, Executive Secretary, *Ker Kwaro Acholi*, interview with author, 22 Nov. 2004, Gulu, Uganda.
98. World Bank. 2000. *Uganda: Post-Conflict Resolution.* Washington: World Bank. 9.
99. Jones Parry, Sir Emyr. President of the Security Council. 2004. *Presidential Statement on Justice and the Rule of Law: The United Nations' Role*: *a statement on behalf of the Security Council 6 Oct. 2004*, available at http://www.ukun.org/search/search_show.asp?Aid=779T=1, accessed 25 Apr. 2005.
100. Finnstrom, *Living With Bad Surroundings.* 201.
101. Novelli, *Karimojong Traditional Religion.* 201–225.
102. Finnstrom, *Living With Bad Surroundings.* 76, 219. See also Evans Pritchard, E.E. 1937. *Witchcraft, Oracles and Magic Among the Azande.* Oxford: Clarendon Press. 154.

103. Confidential interview by author with Sabiny man studying at Makerere University, 7 Nov. 2004, Kampala, Uganda.
104. Ngologoza, *Kigezi and its People.* 20–22.
105. Dixon Kamukama, Professor of Development Studies and History, 15 Nov. 2004, Kampala, Uganda.
106. Waliggo, "Reconciliation as a Means of Resolving Conflict." 2. Also Sister Specioza Kabahoma, Justice and Peace Commission, interview with author, 10 Nov. 2004, Nsambya, Uganda.
107. Allen reports that a study funded by the Belgian government revealed that young people no longer automatically respect the elders. Allen, *War and Justice in Northern Uganda.* 76.
108. Confidential interview by author with Sabiny man studying at Makerere University, 7 Nov. 2004, Kampala, Uganda.
109. Finnstrom, *Living With Bad Surroundings.* 201.
110. Ibid. 298.
111. Ibid. 201.
112. Novelli, *Karimojong Traditional Religion.* 201–225.
1.   113.
     Finnstrom, *Living With Bad Surroundings.* 76, 219. See also Evans Pritchard, E.E.1937. *Witchcraft, Oracles and Magic Among the Azande.* Oxford: Clarendon Press. 154.
114. Mbiti, *African Religions and Philosophy.* xi.
115. Finnstrom, *Living With Bad Surroundings.* 299.
116. Allen, *War and Justice in Northern Uganda.* 84.
117. Quinn, Joanna R. 2005. "What of Reconciliation? Traditional Mechanisms of Acknowledgement in Uganda." Paper prepared for *Reconciliation*, a conference held by the Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict Research Centre at The University of Western Ontario, May 14–15.
118. Confidential interview with author of Sabiny man studying at Makerere University, 7 Nov. 2004, Kampala, Uganda.
119. Peter Otim, Inter-Governmental Authority on Development, interview with author, 23 Nov. 2004, Kampala, Uganda.
120. Idem.
121. Confidential interview with author of Sabiny man studying at Makerere University, 7 Nov. 2004, Kampala, Uganda.
122. Waliggo, "The Human Right to Respect." 9.
123. Ross, *Returning to the Teachings.* 55.