The Power of the Dark Side: Negative Partisanship and Political Behaviour in Canada

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Negative partisanship is the oft-forgotten relative of the more commonly studied party identification. The scholarly lineage of the concept of negative partisanship is as long as that of its positive counterpart (PPID), since the literature that established the latter also treated negative attitudes and evaluations of parties (Campbell et al., 1960; echoed in Fiorina, 1981; Maggiotto and Piereson, 1977). Nevertheless, the volume of scholarship that investigates negative partisanship is dwarfed by the body of literature that considers positive partisanship. Recent efforts have sought to address this lacuna in the literature, and a picture of the sources and effects of negative partisanship (NPID) is beginning to develop (Medeiros and Noël, 2014; McGregor et al., 2014).

In this paper we build upon the comparatively modest negative partisanship literature to consider the effects of NPID on a range of political behaviours. Scholarly accounts of the effects of PPID on political behaviours are nearly uniform in their finding that PPID is an important factor in the activities and attitudes of individuals (Bassili, 1995; Budge and Farlie, 1976; Coulson, 1999; Goren, 2005; Johnston, 2006; Loewen, 2010; McGregor, 2012; Powell, 1986; Smets and van Ham, 2013; Zaller, 1992). We do not know whether NPID has a similar wide-ranging impact, but there are reasons to suspect that negative and positive partisanship may
have different effects, especially given the well-documented negativity bias (Baumeister et al., 2001; Cacioppo and Gardner, 1999; Carmon and Ariely, 2000; Grabe et al., 2000; Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Kahneman et al., 1990; Martin, 2008; Newhagen and Reeves, 1992; Rozin and Royzman, 2001; Soroka et al., 2013; Taylor, 1991; Thaler, 1980). Thus, accounting for the unique influence of negative attitudes may be important for understanding the full effect of partisanship on political behaviour. Beyond vote choice, we consider the impact of NPID upon voter turnout and a range of other traditional and untraditional political activities, both party-based and non-party based. Our results provide evidence of the power of the “dark side” of partisanship.

The Two Sides of Partisanship

Positive partisanship, also known as party identification, is commonly understood as a psychological attachment that an individual holds for a political party (Campbell et al., 1960). It has an affective component and can be understood as a type of social identity (Greene, 1999). Like any identity, it is also relatively “sticky”: one observable implication is its stability over time, even if it is temporarily perturbed by cognitive evaluations updating one’s assessment of the party in question, as in Fiorina’s (1981) running-tally model (Green et al., 2002). We conceive of negative partisanship in similar terms. Holding a negative partisanship toward a party is an affective repulsion from that party, one that is more stable than a current dislike and more strongly held than a passing opinion, resilient in part because it entails selective information gathering and processing that is capable of overriding rational updating.

The limits of the negative partisanship literature belie its deep roots, which stretch back to some of the earliest major analyses of voting behaviour. While it is studied far less often than its positive counterpart, it has long been accepted that the electorate’s negative evaluations and sentiments are important; indeed, this was made clear when the concept of partisanship was first developed (Campbell et al., 1960; Key, 1966; Sigelman and Gant, 1989). Nevertheless, its limited treatment in the literature indicates that it has not been considered as relevant as positive partisanship (Bafumi and Shapiro, 2009).

Typically, when it is studied, negative partisanship is discussed as an attitude that exists separately from positive partisanship and yet is an important component of the total picture of one’s partisan attitudes. Where once the study of partisan identification more or less started and stopped with positive partisanship, and the terms were virtually interchangeable in the literature, we hold, as do our antecedents, that negative partisanship completes the overall concept of partisan identification (see, for example,
Crewe, 1980; Rose and Mishler, 1998). Maggiotto and Piereson (1977) argue that understanding how one evaluates the opponents of a favoured party is required to fully specify partisanship. Wattenberg (1982) argues that partisanship should necessarily include some sense of negativity toward opponents in order to insulate the partisan from shifting loyalties. Crewe (1980) even identifies a variety of partisanship that is based on having stronger negative feelings than positive ones; that is, one’s behaviour will be influenced by avoiding support for a party that is disliked rather than pursuing the party one does like. In some developing party systems, especially those that had a single dominant party, it has been argued that negativity is particularly important for understanding political preferences (see Rose and Mishler, 1998, for post-communist countries; Estrada, 2005, for Mexico). Negative attitudes are thus well established as a component of partisan attitudes, despite the imbalance in the volume of research compared to positive attitudes.

Beyond establishing the concept, recent work has documented the effects of negative partisanship on vote choice in multiple countries (Medeiros and Noël, 2014). Separate from positive partisanship, voters are affected by negative attitudes held toward parties as well. We know, however, that positive partisanship affects much more than just vote choice. Campbell and colleagues consider party identification to be a
perceptual screen through which the individual tends to see what is favourable to his partisan orientation” (1960: 1333), and Johnston states that “strong evidence indicates an impact of partisan predisposition on opinion and values, on perceptions of performance and of candidates, on issue-position imputations for candidates, and on the vote itself” (2006: 347). Partisan identification affects everything from opinion formation (Zaller, 1992) to propensity to contribute to public goods (Smirnov et al., 2010) to when voters make their electoral choices (Bassili, 1995; McGregor, 2012). It even informs and constrains an individual’s political values, while being unconstrained by those values (Goren, 2005). We also know that partisanship increases voter turnout (Smets and van Ham, 2013). Does negative partisanship have this wide range of effects as well?

Before we address this question analytically, two points are relevant. First, negative partisanship, as it has been defined and researched elsewhere, is not the mirror opposite of positive partisanship. It can be held independently (Crewe, 1980; McGregor et al., 2014; Rose and Mishler, 1998) and is influenced separately from positive attitudes (McGregor et al., 2014; Medeiros and Noël, 2014;). While the case has been made from time to time that negative evaluations play a critical role in partisanship and that the concept is incomplete and its measurement flawed without them (Campbell et al., 1960; Fiorina, 1981; Maggiotto and Piereson, 1977), in giving this long-overlooked concept its due we must be careful not to allow the nature of positive partisanship to drive our expectations completely; indeed, evidence exists that ideological identification may itself be non-dimensional, suggesting that positive attitudes toward one side may not result in negative attitudes toward the other (Conover and Feldman 1981). We suggest that the inverse is also true; negative attitudes may be held alone without necessarily entailing a corresponding positive attitude to the opposing side.

A second point to consider, keeping this asymmetry in mind, is that negative information in general is received and processed differently than positive information. It has been established that a negativity bias exists, such that individuals react more strongly to negative than positive information; they are more likely to pay attention to it, more likely to remember it and likely to weight it more heavily when making decisions (Baumeister et al., 2001; Grabe et al., 2000; Newhagen and Reeves, 1992; Taylor, 1991). Many specific cognitive biases are related to this overriding power of negativity, including some that affect how people perceive economic consequences, such as loss aversion, endowment and anchoring biases (Baumeister et al., 2001; Carmon and Ariely, 2000; Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Kahneman et al., 1990 Thaler, 1980). These biases and the negativity bias in general are deeply ingrained, having been adaptive at some point in human evolution, and have measurable effects on how people behave politically, including how they process political information
and whether they choose to become involved (Cacioppo and Gardner, 1999; Martin, 2008; Soroka et al., 2013). This has implications for how positive and negative information may affect attitudes, and thus behaviour, differently. Given this difference, we do not expect that negative partisanship will necessarily have equal-but-opposite effects on the same behaviours as positive partisanship; the dark side of partisanship may have a power all its own.

Therefore, we suspect that the power of a negative attitude toward a party may not lead to the same sort of action as positive partisanship might, but it may motivate individuals to engage in behaviours that disadvantage their disliked party, regardless of the benefits expected for a preferred party (if they have one). Especially if motivated by strong dislike, the desire to “punish” a party may extend past voting for a different option to protesting, engaging in political talk to persuade others not to support the disliked option, and so forth. Negativity could prompt protest behaviours and other opposition-oriented activity, both outside an electoral campaign and during one, and affects attitudes towards supporters of the party for which antipathy is felt (Loewen, 2010); it may even influence certain moral values the way PPID does, though it need not since we do not expect it to mirror all of PPID’s effects (Goren, 2005). Where vote choice is concerned, we argue not that NPID offers a negative partisan any sort of cues about which party to approve or any positive impetus to do so at all, but that it does help to remove certain options from consideration; in other words, it shrinks the menu of available choices. An “ABC” (Anything But Conservative) voter, for example, knows which party not to choose but receives no help from NPID with the “anything” component of the choice.

In summary, our starting point for investigating the effects of negative partisanship is that negative partisanship exists; negative partisanship is separate from but related to positive partisanship. Positive partisanship has been found to affect many aspects of political behaviour and attitudes, and negative information can be more persuasive than positive information. Our analysis will shed light on whether and how important it is to include a measure of negative partisanship as a variable in studies of political behaviour.

**Beyond Voting: Negative Partisanship and Political Behaviours**

In this paper we investigate three types of political behaviour. Two of them are related to voting: vote choice and turnout. We expect negative partisanship to decrease the likelihood of voting for a party, as other research has documented (Medeiros and Noël, 2014); we seek to replicate these results as a baseline for our investigation. We augment the earlier analysis
by considering the NDP as well as the two major competitive parties, thus expanding the range of the ideological spectrum covered by our analysis on the left. Given that McGregor and colleagues (2014) demonstrate that left-right ideology influences NPID, the exclusion of this significant left-wing party might overlook a major part of the NPID story.

Our second focus is on turnout. As might be expected, there is a rich literature on how PPID affects voter turnout (Budge and Farlie, 1976; Coulson, 1999; Loewen, 2010; Powell, 1986) but there is no comparable body of literature on negative partisanship effects. We expect that holding negative partisanship may motivate one to turn out in case one’s vote makes the difference between one’s most-disliked party’s winning and some other, more preferred outcome. This is the same logic as strategic voting: such voters are hopeful that their votes can influence the outcome of the election, so they are more likely to turn out (Blais, 2000; Downs, 1957).

The last behaviours we consider are political activities unrelated to voting. We disaggregate these behaviours into party-related and non-party related acts to tease out any differences that could indicate whether one or the other aspect of partisanship furnishes a stronger influence to engage more or less directly in party competition and operations or instead promotes more general forms (less party-related and perhaps more issue-specific) of political activism. The party-related activities we investigate are volunteering for a party and being a party member, and the non-party related activities are participating in a protest (such as a march or rally), signing a petition, and being politically active online.

The link between positive partisanship and party-related activities is fairly obvious: those who are partisans want their preferred party to be successful and so are more likely to volunteer or become party members. The link with NPID, however, is somewhat less obvious. We have a clear expectation for party membership, as McGregor and colleagues (2014) find that holding PPID can be related to holding NPID for an electoral or ideological competitor. We also suspect that strategic motivation, in the form of supporting other parties in the hope of defeating their negative preference, may be an incentive for volunteering.

Regarding the non-party activities, our expectations are less defined. Protesting and signing petitions are clearly political acts but it is not apparent how these might be affected by NPID. On the one hand, these behaviours may be positively related to the increased interest and attentiveness that comes with partisanship. As holding NPID may be considered a form of political engagement, it may promote additional behaviours akin to various political protest behaviours that were given renewed scrutiny in the wake of the “decline of deference” and “critical citizens” theses (Nevitte, 1996; Norris, 1999). Given that NPID is not the same as generalized anti-politician sentiment, this has yet to be tested. On the other hand,
the strategic motivation to be active in opposition to a disliked party may also lead to behaviours intended to disadvantage it in any way.

**Methodology**

It is important to distinguish between negative partisanship and general anti-politician sentiment when assessing turnout effects. Such sentiments may involve a dislike of parties and political elites or political institutions and politics in general, as opposed to specifically disliking a particular party, for reasons ranging from ideology to a divided society to previous one-party dominance (Estrada, 2005; Garry, 2007; Maggiotto and Piereson, 1977; Rose and Mishler, 1998). We are interested in negative partisanship towards a single party, rather than dislike of all parties. Thus, we are careful to disentangle general anti-politician attitudes from party-specific negative partisanship by controlling for the former in our investigation. Our measure of anti-politician attitudes is based upon responses to a survey question asking about opinions towards politicians in general (values for this variable range from 0 to 100).

We expect NPID and general anti-politician sentiment to have distinct effects upon our outcome variables, but the two variables are related. Combining data from the two elections, a t-test reveals that individuals with NPID have lower opinions of politicians in general than do those without NPID; the difference of 5.2 percentage points is significant at $p < 0.01$. Individuals with positive partisanship rate politicians 6.8 points higher on average than do those without positive partisanship (again, this difference is significant at $p < 0.01$). Thus, both NPID and the absence of PPID are related to increased general anti-politician sentiment, and anti-politician sentiment is higher among those without PPID than those with NPID. These findings reveal a complex relationship between partisan attitudes and general anti-politician sentiment and underscore the importance of controlling for this factor when considering turnout and other political behaviours.

We evaluate the impact of NPID upon political behaviour through a series of three tests, using data from the 2008 and 2011 CES. Our first two tests evaluate the impact of NPID upon voting behaviour. We begin by considering the impact of NPID upon vote choice in a traditional vote choice model, controlling for positive partisanship and short-term factors that may also affect vote preferences. We also include our measure of anti-politician attitudes to control for any aspect of NPID that might derive from more general attitudes. As mentioned above, we expand upon previous analysis of NPID and vote choice by including the left-wing NDP. Next, we evaluate the relationship between NPID and voter turnout. We control for several variables (political interest, age, education,
income, gender and a sense that voting is a duty) that have been shown to have effects on turnout elsewhere (Blais, 2000; Gidengil et al., 2004; Pammett and LeDuc, 2003), as well as anti-politician attitudes. Our final test considers the impact of NPID upon other forms of political behaviour. We analyze party-related activities separate from non-party related activities. Again, we control for a battery of factors that we expect to influence these behaviours (the same variables employed in our turnout models).

We operationalize NPID using a combination of survey questions from the Canadian Election Study (CES). We first consider responses to the following question: “Is there a party you would absolutely not vote for?” This question has been used elsewhere as an indicator of NPID (see Medeiros and Noël, 2014). Nonetheless, we are concerned that using this question alone does not adequately address our conceptualization of NPID as a persistent, affective attitude akin to PPID. For example, it is possible that respondents might indicate they would never vote for a party because they do not take it seriously and believe it has no chance of winning. This opinion could be held without the type of affective attitude we are trying to measure. Therefore, we apply a more restrictive definition of NPID by using responses to party feeling thermometer scores (these scores range from 0–100, where 0 means really dislike and 100 means really like). To ensure that our measure is tapping into negative sentiment, we also require that the NPID party’s feeling thermometer rating be below 50 (the midway point between like and dislike). We believe that this more restrictive measure of NPID is appropriate not only because it minimizes the possibility of false positives in our classification but also because it is a better “match” to the common measure of PPID (which we use here) that considers only those who consider themselves to be “very strong” or “fairly strong” partisans as holding PPID (see Blais et al., 2002; Gidengil et al., 2012). All survey questions used in our analyses are listed in appendix I.

Results

Before evaluating the impact of NPID upon political behaviour, it is worth providing some basic information on the prevalence of NPID in our data. Table 1 shows the distribution of NPID and PPID by party for 2008 and 2011.

In both elections the Conservative party had the highest rate of NPID; just over one in five voters had a strong dislike of the party in 2008, and three in ten had Conservative NPID in 2011. The Conservatives also had the highest rate of PPID in both elections, however, which helps to explain their electoral success. The Liberals had the next highest rate of NPID in both years, and there was an almost 5 percentage point increase
in NPID from 2008 in 2011, but only a 2.6 point increase in PPID. Overall, rates of NPID and PPID are very similar to one another; an average of 65.5 per cent of respondents from the two elections had NPID, while 63.8 per cent held PPID. Thus, negative partisan attitudes are widely held, and all parties are the target of negative attitudes from a noteworthy segment of the sample.

**Vote choice**

The first step in our analysis is to confirm that NPID has a statistically significant impact upon vote choice. Vote choice is the fundamental dependent variable in the field of political behaviour, and establishing a relationship between NPID and this dependent variable provides support for the importance of the concept of negative partisanship in Canada. We recognize, however, that we cannot prove causality with our cross-sectional data and that the temporal order of “would never vote for” responses and actual vote choice is indistinguishable. Nonetheless, we find the analysis useful in order to situate our study in the existing literature, which has approached the evaluation of NPID in the same manner (McGregor et al., 2014; Medeiros and Noël, 2014). Furthermore, while the same issue can be said to apply to PPID, this does not stop scholars from using cross-sectional data to consider the relationship between positive partisanship and vote choice. We extend and build upon existing work by including the NDP, typically considered a minor party, to test whether NPID has the same effect across party types. Due to data limitations, we focus upon the three major parties, outside of Quebec, for this segment of our analysis.

Table 2 contains two multinomial logistic vote choice models for each election. The first includes only partisanship variables (negative and positive) to establish that NPID has an effect independent from PPID. The second introduces a series of short-term factors, with clear partisan

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Entries report marginal effects and standard errors (in parentheses).

*: p < 0.10, **: p < 0.05, ***: p < 0.01
implications, known to have a significant impact upon vote choice (socio-tropic and egocentric economic evaluations, leader evaluations and satisfaction with the government’s past performance), as well as our anti-politician measure. This model evaluates whether the effect of NPID is robust to the addition of other factors.

Table 2 reports marginal effects upon the probability of voting for each party and provides compelling evidence that NPID has a noteworthy relationship with vote choice, for all parties. Even with the introduction of the short-term and general anti-politician variables, the negative partisanship variables retain significant effects. Model 2 demonstrates that the NPID variables are significant correlates separate from PPID in both 2008 and 2011. Likelihood-ratio tests confirm that the inclusion of the NPID variables in the model with controls is an improvement ($p < 0.01$ for both elections). Conservative NPID is related to decreases in the probability of voting Conservative of 12 and 10 percentage points in 2008 and 2011 respectively. The corresponding values are 19 and 14 points respectively for the Liberal party and 25 and 14 points for the NDP.

Negative partisanship thus has a clear and independent effect upon vote choice. NPID decreases the likelihood of voting for a disliked party independent of positive partisanship and a battery of other factors, thus constraining the menu of choices available to a negative partisan but not necessarily offering guidance on which of the remaining options to choose. Furthermore, these results hold for not only for the two traditional political parties, but also for the NDP. Thus, NPID is a highly salient factor, and should be considered when estimating vote models.

**Turnout**

Our next test moves beyond vote choice to evaluate the relationship between NPID and turnout. Recall that we expect NPID to increase turnout; our logic is that individuals may be motivated to vote to prevent a disliked party from winning, much as PPID inspires individuals to go to the polls to support their preferred party (Budge and Farlie, 1976; Coulson, 1999; Loewen, 2010; Powell, 1986). We expect NPID’s effect on turnout to be independent of PPID.

Table 3 contains the results of logistic regression models with turnout as the dependent variable (abstain = 0, vote = 1). Entries show the marginal effects upon the predicted probability of voting. The first model for each year has only the partisanship variables, while the second includes controls. The controls included are known to influence turnout: general political interest, age, education level, income, gender and the sense that voting is a duty as opposed to a choice (Blais, 2000; Gidengil et al., 2004; Pammett and LeDuc, 2003). We also include the general anti-politician variable, again to ensure that the NPID results are not a reflection of a widespread dislike of politicians.
Table 3 shows that the data support our expectations. In the models without controls, both NPID and PPID display the anticipated positive relationship with turnout. In 2008, however, only the effect of NPID is robust enough to withstand the addition of control variables. In 2011, the magnitude of the PPID variable drops by more than half when controls are added, while the decrease in the size of the NPID variable is much less. This suggests that PPID is more strongly correlated with the other factors than is NPID. Indeed, when we compare the correlations between PPID and NPID and the control variables we find that interest, age, and a sense of duty have closer relationships with PPID than with NPID, for both elections.9

We expected NPID to increase rates of turnout, independent of the negative effect of PPID, and our data support this expectation. In the large models, NPID retains a marginal effect of 3 percentage points in both election years. These results suggest that NPID has broader effects on political behaviour than have been previously studied; it affects not only vote choice, but also the decision whether or not to vote in the first place.

Political Activity

Our final test of NPID’s effects is concerned with the relationship between NPID and political behaviours unrelated to voting. Our results so far have shown that NPID has an impact upon voting decisions, for all main parties, and the choice of whether or not to vote. However, citizens may also choose to participate in forms of political action unrelated to voting, and these decisions may be influenced by partisan attitudes. If NPID increases turnout out of a desire by individuals to prevent a disliked party from
winning, it might also motivate individuals to participate in forms of political behaviours that occur outside of the voting booth.

As with our evaluation of turnout, we use two models to evaluate the relationship between NPID and each of five types of political activity: volunteering for a party in the last year and having been a party member (party-related activities), participating in a protest, signing a petition and being active online in the last year (non-party-related activities). The first model for each type of behaviour includes the NPID and PPID variables only, and the second includes the same controls as in the turnout model above, under the assumption that factors which influence voter turnout will similarly influence other forms of political activity. If our analysis reveals that NPID has independent effects, or different effects from PPID, it will provide further evidence that negative partisan attitudes are important to explaining the political behaviour of Canadians.

Table 4 reveals the results of a series of logistic regression models, where the various forms of political activity described above are the dependent variables. Once again, entries report the marginal effects upon the probability of each form of political action.

The results of Table 4 suggest several interesting findings. While PPID is positively related to both types of party related activities, NPID is positively related to only one. Negative partisanship is related to a 7-point increase in the likelihood of party membership, but there is no statistically significant relationship between this factor and volunteering for a party. NPID also has a positive impact upon all three non-party activities, and is associated with a 6-point increase in participating in a protest and being active online and a 7-point jump in signing a petition. Interestingly, PPID displays a statistically significant relationship with only two of these activities; it does not have an impact upon participating in a protest.

These results suggest that negative and positive sentiments can lead to different types of behaviour. As discussed earlier, negativity has been shown to have different effects than positivity and we suspected that there might be differences in how the two types of partisan attitudes affect individuals. That NPID and PPID have different effects upon some types of behaviours, namely protesting and volunteering with a party, is support for this contention. Failing to recognize the influence of NPID would lead to overlooking the impact of negative partisan attitudes upon important forms of political behaviour.

Conclusion

The objective of this study was to take the next step in investigating negative partisanship. The existence of NPID has been demonstrated before, and a modest amount of attention has been paid to the sources of NPID.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Protest</th>
<th>Sign a petition</th>
<th>Be active online</th>
<th>Volunteer with party</th>
<th>Party member</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Non-Party Related Activities</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Have NPID</td>
<td>0.06 (0.01)***</td>
<td>0.05 (0.02)***</td>
<td>0.07 (0.02)***</td>
<td>0.06 (0.02)***</td>
<td>0.07 (0.02)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Have PPID</td>
<td>0.01 (0.01)</td>
<td>0.01 (0.01)</td>
<td>0.04 (0.02)*</td>
<td>0.05 (0.02)***</td>
<td>0.06 (0.02)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest</td>
<td>0.01 (0.01)</td>
<td>0.07 (0.02)***</td>
<td>0.11 (0.03)***</td>
<td>0.02 (0.01)***</td>
<td>0.05 (0.01)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>−0.001 (0.000)***</td>
<td>−0.003 (0.000)***</td>
<td>−0.005 (0.000)***</td>
<td>0.002 (0.000)***</td>
<td>0.005 (0.000)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>0.05 (0.01)***</td>
<td>0.14 (0.02)***</td>
<td>0.11 (0.02)***</td>
<td>0.02 (0.01)***</td>
<td>0.05 (0.02)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>0.00 (0.02)</td>
<td>0.06 (0.03)*</td>
<td>0.02 (0.03)</td>
<td>0.01 (0.01)</td>
<td>0.05 (0.02)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>0.00 (0.01)</td>
<td>0.08 (0.02)***</td>
<td>0.00 (0.02)</td>
<td>0.01 (0.01)</td>
<td>0.06 (0.02)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duty</td>
<td>0.03 (0.02)*</td>
<td>0.09 (0.02)***</td>
<td>0.05 (0.02)***</td>
<td>0.06 (0.02)***</td>
<td>0.05 (0.02)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-politician sent</td>
<td>0.05 (0.03)</td>
<td>0.21 (0.05)***</td>
<td>0.01 (0.05)</td>
<td>−0.08 (0.03)***</td>
<td>−0.12 (0.04)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo R²</td>
<td>0.0101</td>
<td>0.0385</td>
<td>0.0051</td>
<td>0.0581</td>
<td>0.0060</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Entries report marginal effects and standard errors (in parentheses).

*: p < 0.10, **: p < 0.05, ***: p < 0.01.

N = 2247 for all models
However, the effects of this “dark” side of partisanship on political behaviour, especially beyond vote choice, have not been considered until now.

Our results demonstrate that NPID has an independent relationship with several forms of political behaviour: vote choice, turnout, and political activity related and unrelated to parties. NPID influences vote choice in Canada’s multi-party system. Our results build upon existing literature as they show similar effects across all parties, for the NDP as well as the Liberals and Conservatives. Negative partisanship also affects turnout, and is positively related to a variety of other political activities. These results suggest that models of political behaviour that do not account for NPID are missing part of the story. Not only is NPID a component of partisanship that has long been overlooked, it also has important effects, separate from and in some cases different from positive partisanship, that should be considered. Though the effects are not all of a large magnitude, neither are they negligible. NPID has been shown to influence a variety of behaviours, and the concept undoubtedly adds to our understanding of Canadian voters.

Our analysis also highlights an important difference between party-specific NPID and general anti-politician sentiment. We have shown that these two types of attitudes have very different relationships with political behaviours. NPID is positively correlated with turnout rates and many other types of political behaviour, both related and unrelated to official parties. In contrast, general anti-politician attitudes are associated with a decrease in turnout, and while it increases the likelihood of signing a petition, this variable has a negative impact upon volunteering and party membership. Thus, while the effect of this attitude is in the same direction as that of NPID with respect to signing a petition, it has the opposite effect upon turnout, volunteering and party membership. This finding provides important support for the idea that NPID and general anti-politician attitudes are distinct from one another.

Our findings bolster the understanding of NPID that has developed in the partisanship literature. NPID is not the mirror of PPID nor is it a subset thereof. NPID is separate, independent and influential. Scholars of political behaviour would be wise to respect “the power of the dark side” and consider including measures of negative partisan attitudes when developing their behavioural models.

Notes
1 We thank a careful and constructive reviewer for suggesting this terminology.
2 For reasons explained below, we limit our analysis of vote choice to the three major parties outside of Quebec.
3 Both differences hold for the individual elections.
4 The format of the “would not vote for” question varies slightly between elections. In 2011 respondents could select one of five parties, a “none” option, “don’t know,” or “other.” As a result, 2.4 per cent of respondents selected the “other” option. Since we cannot determine which other party they dislike, nor confirm the presence of NPID.
based upon our requirement that the party receive a feeling thermometer rating below 50, these cases are dropped from our analysis. In 2008, instead of an “other” option, there is an “other/multiple” option (3.4% of respondent selected this category). As we are unable to determine whether such respondents dislike a minor party or multiple parties (and which ones), these cases also are dropped.

In comparison to the simple “would not vote for” question, this second requirement lowers the aggregate level of NPID by 13.7 percentage points in 2008 and by 8.6 points in 2011. Replicating our analysis using the baseline “would not vote for” question as an indicator of NPID produces results largely in line with those observed below, with some interesting exceptions. First, the results for the vote choice models (Table 2 below) are slightly stronger when the baseline measure is used; this is not surprising, as the baseline measure captures individuals who will not vote for a party for reasons other than the fact that they dislike that party. Second, the strength of the relationship between NPID and turnout is slightly weaker when the baseline measure is used. Again, this is unsurprising, given the expectation that it is negative attitudes which lead to an increase in turnout, and the baseline measure includes cases where negativity is not necessarily present.

To maximize comparability, we restrict this table to cases where we have data on both variables.

The Green party and its voters are excluded here because there is insufficient variation with respect to vote choice for those individuals who hold Green NPID. In neither 2008 nor 2011 does a single respondent who holds Green NPID vote for the party (this is likely due to the fact that the party has the lowest rate of NPID, combined with the lowest vote share of any of the parties considered here). Thus, our measure of NPID perfectly predicts voting against the Greens (this either causes variables to be dropped from models or a substantial increase in the standard errors, and thus unreliable estimates). While rare for all parties, there are individuals with Conservative, Liberal and NDP NPID that vote for the party they dislike.

We exclude Quebec from the vote choice model for two reasons. First, as the Bloc feeling thermometer question is only asked of residents of Quebec, including Quebec in our model would entail either assuming attitudes for those living in the rest of Canada or not including relevant information about the voting options that face Quebec voters. A separate Quebec-only model was considered but disregarded because the Bloc suffers from the same problem as the Green party - little variation with respect to vote choice. This issue would likely be avoided with an increase in sample size. There is no theoretical reason to suspect that our models would be any different for Quebec voters were this data issue not present.

The average correlations with NPID and PPID respectively are 0.073 and 0.176 for interest, 0.057 and 0.125 for age and 0.045 and 0.116 for duty.

References


Appendix I: Survey Questions

NPID: Is there a party you absolutely wouldn’t vote for? Party feeling thermometers (Conservative, Liberal, NDP, Bloc, Green)

PPID: In federal politics, do you tend to think of yourself as (list of parties)? How strongly do you feel towards this party?
Vote choice: Which party did you vote for?

Controls for Table 2: Over the past year, Canada’s economy has (become better = 1, become worse = 0, stayed about the same = 0.5). Over the past year, your personal financial situation have (become better = 1, become worse = 0, stayed about the same = 0.5). Leadership evaluations (Harper, Ignatieff (2011)/Dion (2008), Layton). (0 = really dislike. 1 = really like). How satisfied are you with the federal government’s performance? (0 = not satisfied at all, 1 = very satisfied).

Controls for Tables 3 and 4: How interested are you in the federal election? (0 = very uninterested, 1 = very interested) Year of birth (used to calculate age). Education (a dummy where having a university degree is coded as 1). Household income (0 = < $30,000/year, 1 => $110,000/year). Is voting a duty or a choice? (1 = duty, 0 = choice) Antiparty/politician variable: How do you feel about politicians in general? (0 = really dislike . . . 1 = really like)